Credit: Timo Wielink (via Unsplash)

The U.S. military is buying your location data

A Motherboard investigation has found that the U.S. military is purchasing location data from a number of different apps. Although the nature of these apps varies, a number include apps intended for Muslim users. The most notable is Muslim Pro, an app which reminds users to pray and helps them identify the location of Mecca. Muslim Pro is hugely popular; according to a counter on its website, it has been downloaded more than 98 million times.

In the context of U.S. counterterrorism – domestic and international – the military’s purchase of large amounts of data about many Muslim app users underlines how surveillance is highly racialised. It also emphasises the close relationship between the digital economy and government. The app economy has undermined privacy and consolidated the military’s power to perform suveillance incredibly effectively.

Read all stories about privacy in the digital economy.

How does the U.S. military purchase location data?

The Motherboard investigation found that there “are two parallel data streams” through which the military has been able to acquire location data. Both are clandestine tools that allow other end-user facing applications to make money. They work by developers installing their software inside their app. The tool is then able to collect data on the product’s users; it gives the app a fee in exchange for ‘access’ to its users.

According Input’s report on the story, one of these  sources of data – X-Mode – “has suggested an app with 50,000 daily active users can net $1,500 in monthly fees.” (This information can be found on X-Mode’s website, where the company features a calculator that helps app developers and publishers determine what they could potentially earn.) Speaking to CNN earlier this year, X-Mode’s CEO Joshua Anton said the company was tracking around 25 million devices every month in the U.S.

The other “data stream” comes from a product called Locate X, owned by Babel Street. Babel Street is, according to its website “the world’s leading AI-enabled data to knowledge company.” The U.S. military’s relationship with Babel Street appears to be a little different to its relationship with X-Code. Motherboard found, through procurement records, that “U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), a branch of the military tasked with counterterrorism, counterinsurgency… bought access to Locate X to assist on overseas special forces operations.”

Locate X’s role in supporting government agencies isn’t new. In March, Protocol reported that the product was purchased by the Customs Border Protection agency, and used by a number of agencies including ICE.

Keep reading: What is surveillance capitalism

What sources of data does the U.S. military have access to via X-Mode and Locate X?

Although U.S. intelligence and military activities have forced the spotlight onto the acquisition of data from Muslim Pro, it appears that the military has been able to acquire location data from many different applications. Most of the detail around this relates to X-Mode rather than Locate X.

According to the Motherboard report, X-Mode runs on apps such as:

  • Accupedo, a step counter.
  • CPlus for Craigslist, an app that helps users search Craigslist listings more easily.
  • Muslim Mingle, a Muslim dating app.
  • Storm tracking app Global Storms.

Do app developers know what’s happening?

While it’s not surprising that users would be in the dark about such activities (“the terms and conditions of these apps don’t help anything, as in most cases they are incredibly vague as to how the data is being used” as Input puts it), the Motherboard report highlights that app developers are not aware of X-Mode’s relationship with the military.

Nicholas Dedouche, CEO of an app development company that built an app that runs X-Mode software, said to Motherboard that he “was not aware that X-Mode was selling those data to some military contractors.”

Exploitation across the digital economy

The confusion around terms and conditions – from both users and developers – highlights the way in which the idea of consumer empowerment could be impotent in the face of such powerful institutions. It’s also further evidence of the way in which economic circumstances help to consolidate power in very specific directions. Not only are users being exploited and watched, developers clearly depend on such predatory products to generate any sort of income.